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ARTICLES
LIEN-TOS: HALF-FINISHED BUILDINGS AND
THE PRIORITY OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS
Gene Berk*
[I]f a man were in a mood to be sensual, he would be
aroused by the Mechanics' Liens Acts.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Mechanics' Liens
Unlike the legal remedies afforded butchers, bakers and
silicon chip makers, the California Constitution grants "me-
chanics,2 materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class" a
lien on real property to secure the payment of the price or
value of work performed and materials furnished that improve
such property.' Why mechanics and materialmen4 have been
* Partner, Hunter McCray Richey & Brewer, Sacramento, California.
1. Charles E. Goulden et al., Comment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CAL.
L. REV. 331 (1963) (quoting the late Justice Curtis Bok of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, "while discussing the unnecessary pother raised by bluenoses about
sex in literature." Love in Fine Paragraphs, TIME, Oct. 19, 1962, at 96 (reviewing
CURTIS BOK, MARIA (1962)).
2. Mechanic is not used in its more modern sense of a machinist, but is
used in its older sense of a laborer, workman or artisan. See WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 736-37 (1988).
3. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 15. The mechanics' lien is entirely an American
statutory innovation. The English common law never recognized a separate and
special mechanics' lien and does not recognize such a lien today. Charles E.
Goulden et al., Comment, California Mechanics' Liens, 51 CAL. L. REv. 331 (1963).
4. For purposes of this article, unless the context clearly requires otherwise,
"mechanics" shall refer to both (1) persons who provide materials and supplies,
and (2) all laborers, whether skilled or unskilled, tradesmen, construction con-
tractors and subcontractors, whether or not such persons also provide materials
and supplies. "Materialmen" shall refer to those persons who only provide mate-
rials and supplies. Although construction contractors and subcontractors have no
constitutional right to a mechanics' lien, the legislature has included them within
the class of mechanics. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3110 (West Supp. 1991).
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singled out for special priority is now only of historical inter-
est, but the morass of statutes6 that make up today's
mechanics' lien laws are of ever growing importance to con-
struction lenders and their title insurers.7
The mechanics' lien laws bear scars from the continual
negotiation undertaken to satisfy the competing and incompat-
ible interests of owners, lenders, prime contractors, subcon-
tractors, mechanics, materialmen, laborers, bonding compa-
nies, and title insurance companies.8 This statutory scheme is
not only unnecessarily complex and inconsistent, but has the
potential to harm the interests purportedly being advanced.
B. Half-Finished Buildings
Consider, for example, the construction of a commercial
or residential building. If all goes well the mechanics are paid
5. As one delegate to the California Constitutional Convention noted:
At every session, the mechanics of San Francisco send a man here
for the purpose of getting the lien law in good position; the result
has been confusion worse confounded all the time. This whole thing
is infirm in principle; they want to make the man who is going to
build a house, the insurer for the fulfillment of a contract with a
third person.
3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1417 (1881) (remarks of Delegate Shafter). Another delegate
remarked:
I understand why the workman should be a preferred creditor, but I
don't understand why the lumberman should be a preferred creditor.
There has been no good reason urged here why he should stand on
any better ground than any other creditor. Certainly lumber dealers
are capable of looking out for their own interests. If they are not
satisfied as to the solvency of the creditor then let them get security.
lid. at 1394 (remarks of Delegate Dudley).
6. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3082-3154 (West Supp. 1991); cf. Spinney v. Grif-
fith, 32 P. 974, 975 (Cal. 1893) ("constitution in this respect is not
self-executing"); Roystone Co. v. Darling, 154 P. 15, 23 (Cal. 1915) ("this confused
and confusing statute"); John J. Hopkins, Selected Mechanics' Lien Priority Problems,
16 HAST. L.J. 155 (1964) ("Even counsel for construction lenders, builders, materi-
almen, title insurers, and others who are confronted daily with problems in this
area, frequently battle the uncertainties and ambiguities in the [mechanics' lien]
law.").
7. "(L]osses due to mechanic's liens have historically been among the highest
categories of loss experience of title insurance companies and in recent years have
been the highest loss experience category." Henry O'Connor, Jr., Mechanic's Lien
Coverage: Have the Policy Changes Changed the Coverage?, in TITLE INSURANCE: THE
NEW POLICY CHANGES 145, 149 (1987).
8. Gordon Hunt, California Mechanics' Lien Law: Need for Improvement, 9 SAN-
TA CLARA L. REV. 101, 101 n.4 (1968).
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on a timely basis and the proceeds from a sale or refinancing
are used to pay off the real estate lender.
But what if the borrower/developer runs into problems
during construction and breaches one or more of the provi-
sions of the loan agreement. The borrower might have failed
to keep the property free of liens, permitted unapproved mod-
ifications to the plans and specifications, allowed unauthorized
delays in completion, or suffered budget overages. The lender
is confronted with a half-finished building as security for its
loan, a defaulting borrower, and unpaid mechanics with
constitutionally-based liens on the property. The lender must
decide between two alternatives: (1) cease advancing funds the
moment any such default occurs and foreclose, thereby wiping
out all junior liens (including mechanics' liens); or (2) advance
additional funds to complete construction, permit the sale of
the real property and now-completed improvements, and use
the proceeds to pay off the construction lender, junior lenders,
and mechanics' lien claimants.
As analyzed in detail below, the statutes regulating the
priority of mechanics' liens encourage construction lenders to
foreclose and wipe out all junior liens (including mechanics'
liens), rather than advance additional funds to complete con-
struction of a building that can be sold or refinanced in order
to pay off all interested parties. What use is a constitutional
grant of lien to mechanics if the legislation regarding
mechanics' lien priority results in the speedy and unnecessary
obliteration of all mechanics' liens at the first sign of a trou-
bled construction project?
C. Civil Code Section 3136
The result described above flows from the practical effects
1992]
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of a little cited9 and widely misunderstood" amendment to
the mechanics' lien laws" now codified at California Civil
Code section 3136 (hereinafter referred to as "section 3136"):
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to the
liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of obligato-
ry advances made thereunder in accordance with the com-
mitment of the lender shall also be prior to the liens pro-
vided for in this chapter as to any other advances, secured
by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are used in pay-
ment of any claim of lien which is recorded at the date or
dates of such other advances and thereafter in payment of
costs of the work of improvement. Such priority shall not,
however, exceed the original obligatory commitment of
the lender as shown in such mortgage or deed of trust."
9. The only reported case in the past decade citing Civil Code § 3136 cor-
rects a petitioner who apparently believed that the second paragraph of former
Code of Civil Procedure § 1188.1 had been repealed rather than reenacted as
Civil Code § 3136. Coast Cent. Credit Union v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr.
468 (Ct. App. 1989).
10. See infra note 12.
11. Although by its terms § 3136 applies only to the question of priority
between mechanics' liens and first deeds of trust, one appellate court has ex-
panded the scope of § 3136 to apply to lien priority between first deeds of trust
and second deeds of trust. Turner v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal. Rptr.
552, 553 (CL App. 1966).
12. Although the plain language of the statute is in the conjunctive ("payment
of any claim of lien . . . and thereafter in the payment of all or any part of the
costs of any work of improvement") (emphasis added), several commentators have
misconstrued and misquoted both Code of Civil Procedure § 1188.1 and its suc-
cessor § 3136 as being in the alternative:
(1) "a lender . . . retains its priority over mechanics' liens for optional ad-
vances which are made to pay a recorded mechanic's lien claim or to pay costs of
construction."
3 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 2D § 8:119
(1989) (citing § 3136) (emphasis added). This is clearly wrong.
(2) "If loan disbursements are optional with the lender, then intervening
mechanics' liens have priority . . . unless the optional advances are used to pay for
the cost of improvement, not exceeding, however, the original obligatory commitment
of the lender." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136 (West Supp. 1991). CALIFORNIA
MECHANICS' LIENS AND OTHER REMEDIES 2D § 1.67 Cal. Cont. Educ. of the Bar
(1988). This is equally wrong.
(3) "If such noncomplying disbursements are used to pay lien claims or
costs of the work of improvement, lender priority may be maintained." Id. at §
8.13 (emphasis added). Wrong again. See CAL. CIv. CODE. § 3136 (West Supp.
1991).
(4) "Former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1188.1 [now CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136]
gives preference to senior construction loans over mechanics' liens for optional as
well as obligatory advances, if the funds were used to pay for actual improvements to
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This article traces the development of section 3136 from
original intent to final enactment. Further, it demonstrates
how the section's form and substance compromises resulted in
a legislative scheme that is out of step with the commercial
realities it is meant to govern, frustrating the purportedly pro-
moted interests of both lenders and mechanics.
The remainder of this article is composed of four sections:
(1) Priority of Construction Liens Before 1957; (2) Legislative
History and Analysis of section 3136; (3) The Special Problem
of Title Insurance; and (4) Conclusion and Recommendations.
II. PRIORITY OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS BEFORE 1957
A. General Priority Principles
The first rule of lien priority is that "[o]ther things being
equal, different liens upon the same property have priority
according to the time of their creation.""5 In the case of a me-
chanic or materialman, the time of creation of his or her lien
is not the date such mechanic or materialman commenced (or
completed) his or her particular work of improvement, nor is
the time of creation the date the mechanic's lien is recorded,
but, rather, all mechanics' liens relate back to the date the first
work of improvement was done by any mechanic or when the
first materials or supplies were delivered by any materialman 4
Thus, a deed of trust or mortgage recorded prior to the
commencement of any work of improvement on the property
will have priority over any subsequently recorded mechanics'
liens". Conversely, a mechanics' lien is preferred to any lien
the property." ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST
PRACTICE § 3.21 (1979) (emphasis added). This is an inaccurate construction of
the plain language of § 3136.
(5) "Moreover, a construction money deed of trust that is prior to a
mechanics' lien as to obligatory advances is also prior as to optional advances that
are used to pay recorded claims of lien or costs of improvement." Goulden, supra
note 1, at 343 (emphasis added) (citing former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1188.1,
now CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136); RICHARD SECREST & EUGENE K. LAWLOR, CALIFOR-
NIA LAND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT §§ 30, 30.27 (1960). Wrong again.
In the words of Casey Stengel after watching a typical game of the hapless
1962 New York Mets, "Can't anyone here play this game?" Baseball: A Game Now
Easy to Define, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 5, 1989, at 9.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2897 (West Supp. 1991).
14. Simons Brick Co. v. Hetzel, 236 P. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1925).
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3134 (West Supp. 1991). Such deed of trust or mort-
gage will be referred to hereinafter as "First Lien."
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(including a deed of trust or mortgage) that "attaches subse-
quent to the commencement of the work of improvement, and
also to any lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or other encum-
brance of which the claimant [the mechanic or materialman]
had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time of com-
mencement of the work of improvement."6
One of the distinctive features of a construction loan deed
of trust is that it secures both initial advances (sums loaned at
the time the lien was created) and future advances (sums
loaned after the initial advance). The issue for the construction
lender is whether the construction loan deed of trust retains
its priority as a First Lien as to such future advances.
Prior to 1957 and the amendment of Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 1188.1 (the predecessor of section 3136), it was
strongly indicated that:
Although California decisions are few and precedents else-
where are unsatisfactory ... California courts will follow
the rule that if a lender, with notice of accrual of
mechanics' liens, makes an advance that he could not be
compelled to make, either because the time for the ad-
vance has not arrived or some condition for payment
thereof has not been fulfilled, the advance is voluntary or
optional and therefore subordinate to mechanics' liens."'
Thus, prior to 1957, the issue of priorities between a con-
struction lender's First Lien and a mechanics' lien was deter-
mined solely by whether any particular advance was character-
ized as obligatory or optional.
16. Id.
17. 2 ARTHUR G. BOWMAN, OGDEN'S REVISED CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY
LAw § 20.46 (1975); cf. MELVIN B. OGDEN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW §
16.29 (1956). See Community Lumber Co. v. California Publishing Co., 10 P.2d 60
(Cal. 1932); Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 9 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1932). See
also Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 P.2d 578, 580-82 (Ct. App. 1962);
Fickling v. Jackman, 265 P. 810, 812-13 (Cal. 1928); Gluskin v. Atlantic Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322-23 (CL App. 1973); Dockrey v. Gray, 341
P.2d 746, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Lumber & Builders Supply Co. v. Ritz, 25
P.2d 1002 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933); Reidy v. Collins, 26 P.2d 712 (Cal. Ct. App.
1933); Machado v. Bank of Italy, 228 P. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924); Langerman v.
Puritan Dining Room Co., 132 P. 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1913); Lawrence M. Parma,
Recent Decisions: Mortgages and Trust Deeds: Future Advances: Priority over Intervening
Liens, 22 CAL. L. REv. 705 (1934).
18. Although the distinction between "optional" advances and "obligatory"
advances shall be discussed, this article shall not develop the much needed analy-
[Vol. 32
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B. Obligatory Advances and Optional Advances
Although one commentator in 1957 believed that "under
tightly drawn modern loan contracts the lender will always be
able to determine whether the advances he makes are optional
or obligatory,"' experience belies that belief. The issue is not,
as suggested above, whether the terms of a loan agreement
intend one advance to be obligatory (and prior to other liens)
and another advance to be optional (and junior to other liens).
The issue is whether a lender intending to make an advance
secured by a First Lien loses the priority of its First Lien to the
extent of such advance if it deviates from the express terms of
a loan agreement, or if it elects to advance money after an
event of default by the borrower rather than exercise its reme-
dies under the loan agreement.'
sis necessary to finally distinguish between the two. One commentator has made
the broad suggestion that all advances made for non-construction purposes (e.g.,
land draw, points, prepaid interest, etc.) are optional and therefore lose their
priority as against mechanics' liens. Hunt, supra note 8, at 103 n.10 (1968) (citing
Soule Steele Co. v. Brewer, Civil No. 126717 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1967)).
19. Dept. of Cont. Educ. of the Bar, Selected 1957 Code Legislation: § 1188.1
(amended): Priority of Mechanics' Liens Over Other Liens, 32 CAL. ST. B.J. 501, 558
(1957).
20. One commentator submits:
[T]hat by virtue of the building loan agreements in use today in the
construction industry, the lender retains such great control over the
building loan funds that any advance made by the lender could be
considered an optional advance especially where the borrower had
violated or breached one or more of the clauses in the building loan
agreement and the lender continued to advance funds, thereby waiv-
ing the breach.
Id. (emphasis added).
Another commentator has suggested a drafting technique that merits consid-
eration. The construction loan agreement should make all advances by the lender
obligatory until and unless the lender gives the borrower written notice of a de-
fault of a specific provision and the borrower, fails to cure such default within ten
days. Edmund T. Urban, Future Advances and Title Insurance Coverage, 15 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 329, 356 n.9 7 (1979). However, this author wonders whether a
court will permit the construction lender to determine whether any particular ad-
vance is optional or obligatory. After all, if a borrower has breached a particular
provision of a loan agreement the additional advance is optional to the extent
that the lender has the full power to choose between making an advance or deliv-
ering a notice of default. How can one be truly obligated to make an advance if
the mere giving of notice followed by the passage of time will make the advance
optional?
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One California appellate court, in Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v.
Williams," illustrated this distinction between obligatory and
optional advances. Ray and Emily Williams obtained a con-
struction loan of five thousand five hundred dollars
($5,500.00) from a mortgage company. Pursuant to the loan
agreement, the mortgage company was "not obligated to ad-
vance the funds as herein provided, or any part thereof, if said
building is not erected in strict accordance with said plans and
specifications."" The loan agreement contained the further
provision that:
[I]n the event that the work of erecting said building is
abandoned for a period of thirty days, then the [mortgage
company] may, at its option, but is not obligated to do so,
complete said building, using for that purpose the funds
remaining in its hands; and any funds so used for such
completion shall be deemed as paid to [Williams] under
the terms of this agreement; and any costs and charges
incurred in the completion of said building in excess of
said amount shall be a lien on the hereinbefore described
property and be secured in a like manner as the mortgage
and trust deed.23
On February 28, 1927, the Yost-Linn Lumber Company
filed a claim of lien for the materials it had supplied for use on
the Williams' property. On March 10, 1927, the Williams aban-
doned the construction work on their building. The abandon-
ment continued for more than thirty days and, at the expira-
tion of the thirty days, the mortgage company exercised its
option to take possession of the premises and complete con-
struction in accordance with the plans and specifications.24
The court found that:
[F]ollowing the 30-day period of abandonment of the work
it was not obligatory upon said corporation to advance any
further sums of money whatever; and that being so ... the
trial court was correct in finding as it did that the sums of
21. Yost-Linn Lumber Co. v. Williams, 9 P.2d 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932).
22. Id. at 325.
23. Id. With some allowance for the quaint language of this loan agreement,
it appears indistinguishable in legal effect from a model loan agreement set forth
at 1 GORDON L. GRAHAM, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY FINANCING 392 app. A
(1989).
24. Yost-Linn, 9 P.2d at 325.
322 [Vol. 32
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money expended subsequent to the abandonment of the
work constituted voluntary advances, and that having been
made after the accrual of the materialmen's liens and with
notice thereof, were not the subject of any superior lien. 5
Although far from a definitive statement of the law, for
this article's purposes, it shall be assumed that a borrower's
uncured breach of a loan agreement causes all subsequent
advances to be considered optional or voluntary.'
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
OF SECTION 3136
A. Background
Clearly, the risk that a First Lien will lose its priority as to
optional advances has caused many lenders to be reluctant to
make optional advances. As one astute commentator observed
there are many instances "where it would be to the advantage
of everyone concerned, owner, lender, potential lien claimant
and contractor, for optional advances to be made."27 This
25. Id. at 326.
26. Hunt, supra note 8. Cf. Turner v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (Ct. App. 1966) (advance made after execution of declaration of default
apparently for failure of work to progress in satisfactory manner is deemed op.
tional, but retains priority by reason of Code of Civil Procedure § 1188.1 (now
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136)); Community Lumber Co. v. California Publishing Co., 10
P.2d 60 (Cal. 1932) (payment made even though condition not satisfied that prior
liens be paid is optional advance); Yost-Linn, 9 P.2d at 324 (advances made after
abandonment of project in violation of loan agreement results in advances being
deemed optional); Althouse v. Provident Mut. Bldg. Loan Ass'n, 38 P. 1018 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1922). But see Dockrey v. Gray, 341 P.2d 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (in-
terest that is not disbursed, but is accrued and included in lender's foreclosure
bid retains priority over intervening liens); Machado v. Bank of Italy, 228 P. 369
(Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (interest payments paid from loan reserve are obligatory and
have priority).
To add to the confusion, the court in Manning v. Queen, 69 Cal. Rptr.
734 (Ct. App. 1968), without discussing optional advances versus obligatory advanc-
es and without citations, held that an advance of funds by a lender for the pay-
ment of delinquent taxes, mortgage insurance premiums, late payment fees and a
"loan advancement fee" retained priority as to such payments even though junior
lienors could foreclose for the nonpayment of such items.
27. Letter from Floyd B. Cerini, Chairman, Legislative Comm., California
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, to Mr. John Bohn, Counsel and Secretary, Senate Interim
Judiciary Comm. Uan. 11, 1957) [hereinafter Cerini], reptinted in SENATE INTERIM
JUDICIAL COMM. REPORT ON ASSEMBLY BILL No. 884, 1 APPENDIX To JOURNAL OF
THE SENATE, CALIFORNIA REG. SESS. OF 1957, 259, 260-62 [hereinafter REPORT ON
A.B. 884].
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commentator went on to identify the two most common situa-
tions in which optional advances are appropriate and should
be encouraged:
A typical illustration is a situation where the construction
loan agreement provides for the advancement of the loan
funds under a five- or six-pay plan ... ." It is not unusual
for work to progress beyond any one of these stages .which
in themselves are not yet completed, but yet the contrac-
tors and subs cannot get their money until the particular
stage entitling the owner or contractor to the loan funds
is... completed. Under such circumstances it is to every-
one's advantage that loan funds be advanced to pay bills
which suppliers and materialmen have presented. They
want the money and the lender would in most cases be
agreeable to advance the loan funds if it could be assured
that it would not lose the priority of its lien.
Another illustration is where it turns out that there are
insufficient funds to complete a work of improvement, and a
lender is agreeable to the making of an additional advance
under his deed of trust, but only if the lien of his deed of trust
would retain priority over the mechanics' lien claims."
B. The Original Proposal: A.B. 884
In response to these concerns, Assemblyman Bruce F.
Allen introduced the following amendment to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1188.1 (hereinafter referred to as A.B. 884):
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to any
of the liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of
obligatory advances made thereunder in accordance with
the commitment of the lender shall also be prior to the
liens provided for in this chapter as to any other advances,
secured by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are used
in payment or reimbursement of the payment of all or any part
of the costs of any work of improvement on the property which is
suject to such mortgage or deed of trust."
If A.B. 884 had been promulgated in its bill form as intro-
duced by Assemblyman Allen, it would have clarified the rela-
28. See infra note 34 for illustration of such pay plans.
29. Cerini, supra note 27, at 262.
30. REPORT ON A.B. 884, supra note 27, at 259-60 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 32
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tionship and priorities between lenders' liens and mechanics'
liens. A First Lien would have remained a First Lien as to all
advances of funds used to improve the property regardless of
the characterization of any single advance as optional or oblig-
atory. 
3
C. The First Amendment to A.B. 884
On April 5th, 1957, A.B. 884 was substantially and materi-
ally amended as follows:
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to any
of the liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of
obligatory advances made thereunder in accordance with
the commitment of the lender shall also be prior to the
liens provided for in this chapter as to any other advances,
secured by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are used
in payment or reimbursement of any claim of lien as pro-
vided for in this chapter which is recorded at the date or
dates of such other advances, if any, and thereafter in the
payment of all or any part of the costs of any work of
improvement on the property which is subject to such
mortgage or deed of trust."
As originally conceived, A.B. 884 clarified law and practice
in at least two troubling areas related to construction lenders'
advances: (1) optional advances made prior to exhaustion of
the original loan fund; and (2) additional advances made after
exhaustion of the original loan fund."3 As amended above,
A.B. 884 failed to clarify either of the above issues.
1. Optional Advances Made Prior to Exhaustion of Original
Loan Fund
Lenders make optional advances prior to the exhaustion
of the original loan fund for two reasons. First, the advance
might be made pursuant to the waiver of a condition, for ex-
ample where the lender uses a "progress payment system " '
31. See EMORY WASHBURN, OGDEN'S REVISED CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW
§§ 20.45-20.46 (1987).
32. 1957 CAL. ASSEMBLY DAILY J. 2397 (Apr. 5, 1957) (redlining added).
33. The natural corollary of such clarification is that lenders would have been
better able to predict the nature and extent of damages not covered by title insur-
ance resulting from the loss of lien priority. For discussion of title insurance prob-
lems related to § 3136, see infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
34. In the typical progress payment system, the construction project is divided
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and the borrower requests an advance prior to completion of a
particular pay stage. Second, there may have been a breach of
the loan agreement. For example, the borrower abandons the
project and the lender, pursuant to an express provision of the
construction loan agreement, completes the project prior to
foreclosure, or the lender makes an advance after the borrow-
er breaches a covenant of the loan agreement requiring bor-
rower to keep the property free of mechanics' liens.
In the case of either waiver or breach, A.B. 884, as origi-
nally conceived, would have allowed lenders to make such
optional advances and retain their all-important First Lien as to
such optional advances. Lenders would have merely been re-
quired to ensure that the proceeds of the optional advances be
used to pay for the costs of construction."3 This should have
been sufficient to protect both mechanics and construction
lenders. Since lenders would not have been able to use option-
al advances for loan fees, points, interest, principal payments,
into stages and a certain portion of the loan fund is disbursed directly to the
borrower upon the completion of each stage. The borrower receives a set per-
centage of the full loan amount at the completion of each stage regardless of
whether the aggregate amount of the bills from mechanics and materialmen is
greater than or less than the portion of the loan amount to be disbursed. Natural-
ly, lenders are frequently urged to disregard or waive satisfaction of certain condi-
tions to the completion of a stage and make an anticipatory advance. 2 ARTHUR
G. BOWMAN, OGDEN'S REVISED CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAw § 20.46 (1975).
Although five-pay plans and six-pay plans are typical, the following seven-pay plan
is illustrative of the scheme: 1st installment of 20% of loan amount disbursed
when foundation, underground plumbing and floor joists or slab are in place for
main structure and rough lumber (except rafters, trusses and sheathing) is on the
site; 2nd installment of 15% of loan amount disbursed when rough framing is
substantially complete, including rafters; 3rd installment of 20% of loan amount
disbursed when finished roof is on (except tile), rough plumbing, rough electrical,
rough heating, rough air conditioning and framing are complete; 4th installment
of 10% of loan amount disbursed when interior plastering and drywall installation
is complete and exterior has brown coat on stucco portions and prime coats of
paint on wood portions; 5th installment of 10% of loan amount disbursed when
doors are hung, cabinets are installed, and all interior ceramic tile and formica
work are complete; 6th installment of 10% of loan amount disbursed when con-
struction is complete and Notice of Completion has been filed; 7th and final in-
stallment of remaining 10% of loan amount disbursed upon the occurrence of
either of two conditions related to expiration of lien periods. Inspection and Dis-
bursement Schedule (Residential Construction) of Commerce Savings Bank, Sac-
ramento, California.
35. The typical lender will have a system of on-site inspection of physical
progress to ensure, for its own benefit, that loan funds are being used for con-
struction purposes. Such on-site inspections should uncover the most common
problems of delay: weather, fraud, and incompetence.
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or land draws without risking the priority of their First Lien,
all advances would have gone towards improving the property
and, presumably, enhancing the value of the security of all
lienholders.
2. Additional Advances Made After Exhaustion of Original
Loan Fund
In addition to the issue of anticipatory or optional advanc-
es made prior to the exhaustion of the original loan fund,
lenders must be concerned with the priority of their First
Liens when making additional advances to complete a con-
struction project if the original loan amount turns out to be
insufficient to complete construction. Typically, there are three
situations in which the original loan commitment turns out to
be insufficient to complete the project. For one reason or an-
other, the original estimates of construction costs are inaccu-
rate. The borrower may be unscrupulous and the lender care-
less, for example where the borrower diverts loan funds from
one project to fund another project. Finally, a crooked bor-
rower may divert loan funds for personal use.'
The issue may be restated: Who is to bear the risk of loss
where the original loan commitment is insufficient to complete
the work of improvement? As originally conceived, A.B. 884
proposed a balanced approach. The lender ensures that addi-
tional advances are used solely to pay the costs of construction,
and the mechanics share the risk pro rata that the completed
work of improvement will equal the value of the labor or mate-
rials they have contributed. As amended, A.B. 884 requires
lenders to first ensure that all mechanics who have recorded
36. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 506 which states:
[A]ny contractor who appropriates money paid to him for any use or
purpose, other than for that which he received it, is guilty of embez-
zlement, and the payment of laborers and materialmen for work per-
formed or material furnished in the performance of any contract is
hereby declared to be the use and purpose to which the contract
price of such contract, or any part thereof, received by the contractor
shall be applied.
This 1919 amendment to Penal Code § 506 has been held to be unconsti-
tutional and an invalid exercise of police power if it is construed as making it
embezzlement for a contractor to merely breach his or her agreement with me-
chanics and materialmen. People v. Holder, 199 P. 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921). See
also People v. Bullock, 268 P. 1059, (Cal. Ct. App. 1928); American Surety Co. v.
Bank of Italy, 218 P. 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
3271992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mechanics' liens are reimbursed. Only then may the lender
allow additional advances to be used to pay for the costs of the
construction. Therefore, lenders are required to play the same
intensive administrative role regardless of whether the borrow-
er is honest and capable or dishonest and incompetent. How-
ever, as discussed below, the final amendment to A.B. 884
foreclosed the possibility of advancing funds after the exhaus-
tion of the original loan fund.
D. The Second Amendment to A.B. 884
On May 8, 1957, the Senate further amended and adopted
A.B. 884, as amended, as follows:
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to any
of the liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of
obligatory advances made thereunder in accordance with
the commitment of the lender shall also be prior to the
liens provided for in this chapter as to any other advances,
secured by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are used
in payment of any claim of lien as provided for in this
chapter, if any, which is recorded at the date or dates of
such other advances, if . .y, 'and thereafter in the pay-
ment of all or any part of the costs of any work of im-
provement on the property which is subject to such mort-
gage or deed of trust; provided, that the priority of such
mortgage or deed of trust shall not exceed in total for
both obligatory advances made in accordance with the
commitment of the lender and other advances the amount
of the original obligatory commitment of the lender as
shown in said mortgage or deed of trust."
This second amendment to A.B. 884 resolves one impor-
tant issue unsatisfactorily, yet completely. The lien securing an
additional advance to complete a project after the original loan
fund is exhausted will be junior in priority to all mechanics'
liens, whether such mechanics' liens are recorded prior to the
time of the additional advance or recorded after the time of
the additional advance. 9
37. This author cannot explain the switch in positions of "if any," whether
for reasons of logic, syntax, or grammar.
38. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1188.1 [now CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136], REPORT
ON A.B. 884, supra note 27, at 263 (redlining added).
39. As one commentator at the time stated:
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Under these circumstances, lenders have no choice but to
foreclose and wipe out all junior liens (i.e., all mechanics'
liens). No system to ensure payment of recorded mechanics'
liens will be sufficient. Unrecorded mechanics' liens will have
priority over First Liens as to additional advances in excess of
the original obligatory amount of the loan. Title insurance
coverage is, of course, lost. It is now impossible to guarantee
the priority of a First Lien securing additional advances be-
yond the original loan amount.
E. Alternative Trust Fund Proposals
It has been recognized that the typical loan agreement
imposes no burden upon construction lenders "to see that the
money advanced thereunder was, in fact, applied to payments
for labor and materials furnished in the construction work.
Hence, any payments made to or on behalf of [a borrower]
were in discharge of the agreement of [a construction lender]
and brought it under no liability to the [mechanic] lien claim-
ants."40
The clear effect of the proposals finally promulgated as
section 3136 is to make lenders responsible for the payment of
mechanics and materialmen. If the lender desires to ensure the
By limiting the priority to the amount of the original obligatoty com-
mitment, the amendment carries the implication that the "obligatory"
nature of the advances is no longer dependent solely on the amount
which the lender has obligated himself to loan . . .. but also on the
purpose for which the money was loaned. Therefore, while the effect
of the amendment will depend on the interpretation of "obligatory"
as defined in each contract, it is possible that if the lender does not
insure that his advances are used for the purpose for which the loan
was contracted, he will, to the extent of the advances, lose the priori-
ty of his security, unless such advances are used to pay mechanics' lienors.
Dept. of Cont. Educ. of the Bar, Selected 1957 Code Legislation: § 1188.1, 32 CAL.
ST. B.J. 501, 558 (1957).
40. Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 271 P. 898, 901 (Cal. 1928). See also
Gill v. Mission Say. & Loan Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Ct. App. 1965) (no ac-
tionable negligence for lender to fail to properly supervise disbursement of loan
funds). But see Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am., 129 Cal. Rptr. 91,
94 (Ct. App. 1976) ("having agreed to and undertaken to disburse the loan pro-
ceeds in accordance with the value of the construction as it progressed, [construc-
tion lender] owed to Owner (of the property] the duty to exercise reasonable care
in so doing"); Middlebrook-Anderson Co. v. Southwest Say. & Loan Ass'n, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 338 (CL App. 1971) (action for violation of subordination agreement for
lender to fail to properly supervise disbursement of loan funds).
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priority of its First Lien as to optional advances, it must over-
see payment of mechanics from the loan funds. In effect, the
lender holds the undisbursed loan funds in trust for the bene-
fit of mechanics and materialmen.4"
Whether by happenstance or design, two "trust fund"
proposals were being debated in the California legislature at
approximately the same time as the amendments to A.B. 884
were introduced." S.B. 2194 provided that, if a lender satis-
fied one of the two following conditions, the lien of the lender
securing "future advances" would be prior to the liens of me-
chanics and materialmen. The lender could qualify for priority
posting by a labor and material bond inuring to the benefit of
mechanics and materialmen." Additionally, the lender could
qualify for priority if the lender and borrower execute a writ-
ing (which may be the deed of trust itself or a separate loan
agreement):
[P]roviding in substance and legal effect that... [t]he
funds to be so advanced by the lender shall be a trust fund
devoted solely to the purpose of paying laborers, subcon-
tractors, materialmen, segregated contractors, and others,
41. This "trust" theory is in some ways reminiscent of the equitable
mechanics' lien asserted in a line of cases commencing with Smith v.
Anglo-California Trust Co., 271 P. 898, 900-02 (Cal. 1928), but later eliminated by
the legislature in 1967 by its promulgation of Civil Code § 3264. See Nibbi Bros.,
Inc. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289 (Ct. App. 1988). As the
Nibbi court stated, the judicial expansion of the equitable mechanics' lien doctrine
"appeared to prevent lenders from applying unexpended construction loan funds
to the repayment of the developer's debt until the rights of all subcontractors and
materialmen had been settled, consequently increasing their financial exposure." Id.
at 291. The Nibbi court further recognized that Civil Code § 3264 drew a fair line
between:
[T]he contractors, subcontractors and materialmen on the one hand
and the construction lenders on the other. The former at least have
remedies by mechanics' lien against the property, unbonded stop no-
tices against the owner, and action upon the contract against the
person or persons personally ordering the labor or material. The lat-
ter are relieved of the expense and risk of policing the ultimate distri-
bution of construction funds and can concentrate on their primary
duty of providing construction loans at lesser expense to the borrow-
er and ultimately to the consuming public.
Id. at 292. The same fair line drawn in Civil Code § 3264 is skewed in § 3136.
42. A.B. 1452, CAL. LEGIs. REG. SESS. (1957) (proposing to characterize funds
received by contractor or subcontractor as a trust fund for payment of materials,
labor and supplies); S.B. 2194, CAL. LEGis. REG. SEss. (1957) [hereinafter S.B.
2194].
43. Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3138 regarding the posting of bonds.
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who under the statutes of the State of California, are enti-
tled to mechanics' liens on such work of improvement
then or thereafter engaged upon in connection with such
work of improvement and that the borrower shall not have
any beneficial interest in said funds unless and until said
purpose has been fulfilled."
S.B. 2194 also provided that a lender would have no right
to apply any undisbursed sums to the reduction of principal or
to the payment of any installment of principal or interest until
amounts owing on all valid liens recorded against the project
property and amounts owing on any valid notices to withhold
filed with such lender had first been paid." Finally, valid liens
recorded by mechanics would be prior and paramount to
those of the lender securing advances used for:
[Flurther work of improvement or the payment of bills for
such further work, but there must be satisfied before
funds shall be used for the last mentioned purpose, all
existing stop notices and notices of mechanics' liens for
work or materials already done or furnished before any
part of the residue of said fund undisbursed can be used
for further work of completion on said improvement. 6
Thus, a textual analysis suggests that the form of A.B. 884
as originally proposed was retained, but the substance of the
various "trust fund" proposals was adopted. As promulgated in
its final form47, section 3136 places the burden of protecting
44. S.B. 2194(1)(b)(1), supra note 42, at 265. A.B. 1452 proposes a similar
trust fund methodology.
45. S.B. 2194(1)(b)(2), supra note 42, at 265.
46. Id.
47. Section 1188.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed in 1969 and
recodified. The first paragraph Code of Civil Procedure § 1188.1 was reenacted as
Civil Code § 3134 and the second paragraph of Code of Civil Procedure § 1188.1
(i.e., tie final version of A.B. 884) was reenacted as § 3136 as follows:
A mortgage or deed of trust which would be prior to any of the
liens provided for in this chapter to the extent of obligatory advances
made thereunder in accordance with the commitment of the lender
shall also be prior to the liens provided for in this chapter as to any
other advances, secured by such mortgage or deed of trust, which are
used in payment of any claim of lien oz p.-eAdz1 for -'H this ehaptz.,
if-RyT which is recorded at the date or dates of such other advances
and thereafter in the payment of Al OF a:y part Of th zosts of a"
the work of improvement :. thz frvfep-ty whizh is sujez tz szh
.R..g. ..d Of .k:fi, prz1Aed, that the F-i..ity Of Suah mrt
gage or. ded Af .... Such priority shall not, however, exceed if*
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mechanics and materialmen upon the lenders. Under both
section 3136 and the "trust fund" proposals, the remedy in the
event lenders fail to ensure that mechanics and materialmen
are paid for their services and materials is the loss of priority
of the lender's lien. Other than the characterization of the loan
funds as a trust fund (presumably characterizing the lender as
a trustee), there is little to distinguish section 3136 as it finally
became law from the trust fund proposals then pending before
the California legislature.
However, the time A.B. 884 was being debated one com-
mentator had a very different interpretation of the proposed
statute:
The net effect of [A.B. 884] would be to amend existing
law to provide that where the deed of trust contains provi-
sion for optional advances and the said optional advances
are in fact made and money received therefrom is used for
payment of services or material which go into a construc-
tion project, then the priority of the deed of trust for all
moneys advanced thereunder including optional advances
will be as of the date the deed of trust is recorded which
means, in normal situations prior to mechanics' liens."'
If the intent of the legislature is accurately reflected in the
comments of the legislative counsel quoted above, the drafters
badly missed their mark. The plain language of the statute
grants priority only to liens securing optional advances used
for the payment of recorded mechanics' liens and thereafter
used for the payment of the costs of services and goods used
for construction. The only mechanics' liens that are inferior to
such optional advances are those mechanics' liens not actually
of record at the time of the optional advance.
Recourse to judicial expressions of legislative intent to
resolve this apparent conflict with the plain meaning of section
tAW feF beth bligatzr aiRrc- .eSzb- F FI 
.  
O R . . A PP R... 4A th e . G .
.'t.z-M nt Of SP l FdPzF . .I z A 91 zth' .... thz d1 UR . zbf thz original
obligatory commitment of the lender as shown in said mortgage or
deed of trust.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136 (redlining added). Added by Stats. 1969, c. 1362, P. 2764,
§ 2 (operative Jan. 1, 1971). The reasons for the textual amendments, if any, have
been lost, and to date no court or commentator has suggested that the textual
amendments have any legal or practical import.
48. Counsel for the Senate Comm. on Judiciaty, Comments, reprinted in REPORT ON
A.B. 884, supra note 27, at 262-63.
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3136 are of no avail. Courts have stated clearly that the
mechanics' lien laws are remedial and should be broadly con-
strued to protect mechanics.49 Yet courts have stated that the
Civil Code sections prescribing rules for determining priority
are designed for the protection of those who take security
interests in land as well as for the protection of mechanics' lien
claimants.' Although one court5' has used the legislative
counsel's expression of legislative intent to justify the extension
of section 3136's reach to junior liens other than mechanics'
liens, no other court has used it to preserve a First Lien as to
an optional advance that was not used as section 3136 re-
quires.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ISSUES
A. Incentive to Foreclose
As adopted, Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 (now
section 3136) makes foreclosure the remedy of choice for lend-
ers confronted with a breach of a construction loan agree-
ment.52 Negotiation and workouts are not viable alternatives
because no advance after a breach can be legally compelled.
Therefore, in order to made an optional advance and maintain
any pre-existing priority, lenders must ensure that recorded
mechanics' liens are paid first and thereafter ensure that all
further advances are used to pay for the costs of construction.
Where the original loan fund is exhausted and the lender
is confronted with a choice between instituting a foreclosure
action or making an additional advance to complete a project,
the lender may consider foreclosure the only viable alterna-
49. Patten-Blinn Lumber Co. v. Francis, 333 P.2d 255, 260 (Cal. App. 1958);
Gallagher v. Campodonico, 5 P.2d 486 (Cal. App. 1931); cf. Bottomly v. Rector of
Grace Church, 2 Cal. 90 (1852) (statute prior to 1879 Constitution giving a lien
to mechanics is in derogation of common law and should be strictly construed).
50. Tracy Price Assoc. v. Hebard, 72 Cal. Rptr. 600, 606 (Ct. App. 1968).
51. Turner v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 552, 553 (Ct. App.
1966). See infra text accompanying note 67.
52. See, e.g., Foellmer v. Midway Lime & Cement Co., 6 P.2d 333 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1931). In Foel/mer, a first deed of trust and second deed of trust attached
prior to the commencement of construction of a single family residence. The
court held that foreclosure of the second deed of trust wiped out junior
mechanics' liens and subsequent optional advances under the theory that the first
deed of trust retained priority because mechanics had no lien against the real
property.
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tive.5" In this situation, lenders will not risk the priority of
their First Liens, nor will lenders advance funds to mechanics
who have already completed their work or delivered their ma-
terials. Such advances will not in any way enhance the value of
the lender's security. Therefore, lenders will foreclose.
If the lender is the successful bidder at the foreclosure
sale, it will take the property free of all junior liens, including
mechanics' liens. The lender will then complete the project
using the same funds that it would have been willing to ad-
vance to the borrower absent the madate of section 3136. Fi-
nally, the lender will sell the now-completed project with some
hope that it will not only recoup the original loan amount plus
accrued interest, but that it may turn a profit. If the lender is
the unsuccessful bidder at the foreclosure sale, the lender will
be paid off in full, and the successful bidder will take the prop-
erty free of all liens. In either event, this legislative scheme
virtually guarantees greater losses to junior lienholders. This
result occurs because junior liens become more frequently
foreclosed by the First Lien than if the construction lender
were permitted to make optional advances to pay for the costs
of construction, thus enhancing the value of the security held
by all lienholders.
B. Preferences Among Mechanics
In addition, section 3136, as finally adopted by the legisla-
ture, introduced, without discussion, a significant new issue:
Why is the class of mechanics and materialmen who complete
their work or deliver their materials in the early stages of a
construction project preferred over the class of mechanics and
53. In the event loan funds are insufficient to complete a project (and the
lender is unwilling to advance additional funds), the typical loan agreement will
require borrowers to deposit sufficient funds to complete the project with the
lender. Although some borrowers will have the wherewithal to complete the pro-
ject using their own funds, most borrowers will have to seek independent financ-
ing. Such independent financing may require security other than a deed of trust
or mortgage on the project property. After all, the project property will have a
trust deed and numerous junior mechanics' liens superior in priority to any new
security interest. To obtain new financing in this situation seems unnecessary, and
unnecessarily burdensome, compared to allowing the original construction lender




materialmen who complete their work or deliver their materi-
als in the later stages of a construction project?'
In most other contexts, mechanics' liens are considered to
be equal regardless of the time the claimants performed their
labor or delivered their materials." Section 3136 protects the
interests of those mechanics who have recorded their liens.
However, their protection comes at the expense of those me-
chanics who have not yet recorded liens. One can only wonder
why section 3136 should not be as "applicable to the claimants
putting in the foundation, or the rough plumbing, as it is to
the carpenter driving in the last spike."' It seems axiomatic
that "all other factors being equal the rights of one contribut-
ing to the construction should not depend on the state thereof
at which his contribution was made."57
C. Oversight Systems
By adding the phrase "and thereafter" rather than "or" to
section 3136, the legislature expressly mandated that lenders
who desire to retain the priority of their First Liens as to op-
tional advances must institute a more elaborate oversight sys-
tem to ensure that advanced funds are first used to pay me-
chanics who have recorded liens. The lender might institute a
more costly, but more efficient, "voucher system"' to dis-
burse loan funds. The voucher system is neither simple nor
cheap. It requires a much larger administrative staff and is
primarily used by larger lending institutions."
54. It is also curious that § 3136 provides such an obvious incentive for me-
chanics to record liens early even though they could wait until after the comple-
tion of the entire work of improvement to file their claim of lien.
55. Consolidated Lumber Co. v. Bastien, 5 P.2d 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931);
Stimson Mill Co. v. Nolan, 91 P. 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907).
56. McBain v. Santa Clara Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 51 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App.
1966) (analyzing the doctrine of equitable liens). See supra note 41.
57. Id.
58. In a voucher system, the mechanic bills the borrower, or the contractor
acting as the borrower's agent. The borrower or contractor then provide the me-
chanic with a voucher in the full amount of the bill. The mechanic presents the
voucher to the lender who pays the mechanic. The typical voucher form includes
a release of mechanics' lien and stop notice rights. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3262
(West Supp. 1991).
59. Smaller lending institutions can contract with voucher control companies.
The charge, of course, is passed through to the borrower and, ultimately, to the
consumer.
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In the alternative, the lender might institute a system to
search title prior to each advance and obtain releases' from
all mechanics who have recorded liens at the time of the ad-
vance. "' However, unless the lender utilizes an escrow to pay
mechanics, such a tide search remains problematic. A title
search must be made at some set point in time, typically 8:00
a.m., while progress payments will be advanced sometime after
the title search, typically at the end of the work day. Thus, the
lender bears the risk of loss due to an intervening mechanics'
lien recorded prior to the time of the advance and after the
title search.62
As one court recognized in a similar context, if lenders are
"relieved of the expense and risk of policing the ultimate dis-
tribution of construction funds [they] can concentrate on their
primary duty of providing construction loans at lesser expense
to the borrower and ultimately to the consuming public.""
D. Disputed Mechanics' Liens
Section 3136 does not provide alternatives in the case of a
disputed mechanics' lien. Consider the following paradigm. A
mechanic records a lien prior to an advance of loan funds. The
borrower vehemently denies that any money is owed the me-
chanic. Should the lender make an advance after the date of
the recorded, albeit disputed, mechanics' lien? As keeping the
subject property free of mechanics' liens is a covenant of the
typical loan agreement, the advance is optional, so the lender
risks the priority of its First Lien as to all advances made after
60. One particularly troubling aspect of § 3136 is that it only preserves the
priority of advances that are first "used in payment of any claim of lien." What of
advances made after liens have been released absent payment, whether by reason
of negotiation, settlement or workout? There is nothing in the plain language of
§ 3136 or its legislative history that can be used to rebut an argument that a First
Lien loses its priority as to optional advances after a mechanics' lien has been re-
leased, but not paid.
61. This is what most lenders expect from their "122" endorsements. See infra
text accompanying notes 68-72. The lender might also institute other fiscal con-
trols such as a call for receipted bills or the issuance of joint checks.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72 regarding lack of title insurance
coverage for damages suffered due to loss of priority to mechanics' liens by rea-
-son of making an optional advance.
63. Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 253 Cal. Rptr. 289




the date the mechanics' lien is recorded. It is unlikely that any
lending institution will be sufficiently reckless as to risk the
loss of priority as to such advances. To foreclose for breach of
the covenant to keep the subject property free of mechanics'
liens in this case, however, is a harsh and inefficient remedy. It
is inconceivable that the legislature intended to permit one
disgruntled mechanic to record a lien and hold up an entire
project. Yet, this is the unintended consequence of a require-
ment that loan funds be used first to pay recorded mechanics'
liens and thereafter to pay the costs of construction.
E. Enhancement of Security
One commentator has suggested that:
The senior may respond [to the loss of priority] that even
if the later payments were optional, they were nevertheless
necessary to protect the security. Because a half-finished
project.is a liability, and since the remaining payments
actually improved the property, benefitting juniors as well,
the lender should not be denied priority."
To cite section 3136 is both wishful and puzzling. To re-
tain priority under section 3136, optional advances must first
be used to pay recorded lien claimants. This would do little to
assist a lender faced with a defaulting borrower, a half finished
building, and insufficient loan funds remaining to complete
the project. However, the commentator is quite correct that
the law must recognize that an advance to improve the proper-
ty benefits all creditors, both senior and junior, and should be
encouraged. Unfortunately, the plain meaning of section 3136
resists this desirable interpretation.
In addition, one court has already addressed this proposi-
tion and found it wanting. In a fact pattern similar to
Yost-Linn, a lender claimed that it was necessary to advance
funds to protect its security after the borrower abandoned the
construction project. In determining that the advances made
were optional, the court responded to the argument that Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 3136 should protect the lender's
priority. "We fail to see how the advancements became obliga-
64. ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRAc-
TICE § 3.27 (2d ed. 1990) (citing, inter alia, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3136).
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tory in any sense, except that for its own interest appellant
may have felt obliged to complete the building, so that the
property might be sold to better advantage."' The court,
however, cryptically added, "[b]ut so far as the evidence shows,
the property as it stood at the time when the work of construc-
tion was abandoned by the [borrower] was sufficient in value
to protect the $3,000 loan theretofore made by appellant. '
As of the date of this article, no court has yet seized this
language, written before the promulgation of section 3136 and
its predecessors, to permit a lender to prove that an advance
made after abandonment remained obligatory when necessary
to preserve the value of the lender's security. To allow lenders
to proffer such proof would certainly sharpen the knife neces-
sary to cut the Gordian knot tied by the California legislature
when it adopted section 3136.
F. Extension to All Liens
To complete the puzzle of section 3136, one California
appellate court extended the reach of section 3136 beyond
mechanics' liens to all junior liens:
We think it clear that the Legislature intended to change
the existing case law with respect to the priority of option-
al advances used, as in the instant case, for 'the payment
of all or any part of the costs of any work of improvement
on the property which is subject to such mortgage or deed
of trust.6 '
Although somewhat beneficial to lenders, it is unlikely that
the Turner court's statement of legislative intent is correct. It
seems that the court misread California Civil Procedure Code
section 1188.1 (now California Civil Code section 3136). Under
the Turner court's interpretation, so long as there are no re-
corded mechanics' liens and the advanced funds are used to
pay for the costs of improvement, the holder of the First Lien
can make an optional advance and retain the priority of its
First Lien over unrecorded and inchoate mechanics' liens as
well as any other junior lien encumbering the property. How-
65. Althouse v. Provident Mut. Bldg. Loan Ass'n, 209 P. 1018, 1022 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1922).
66. Id.
67. Turner v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Ct. App. 1966).
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ever, the beneficial effect of even this interpretation is ex-
tremely narrow. There is no reason to suspect that the limita-
tion of priority to the original obligatory commitment of the
lender does not apply with equal force and effect to junior
liens as it does to mechanics' liens.
The Turner court's interpretation must also be criticized
on other grounds. The apparently long and ignoble tradition
of misreading and misinterpreting section 3136 continues
here. Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 (now Civil Code
section 3136) explicitly stated that it was limited to the issue of
priority of mortgages and deeds of trust "to the liens provided
for in this chapter." At the time of the Turner decision, in
1966, Code of Civil Procedure section 1188.1 was found in
Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Section
3136 is found at Article 6, Chapter 2, Title 15 of the Civil
Code.) The Turner court ignored the fact that the junior deed
of trust in question was a purchase money deed of trust and
was undoubtedly created under Chapter 2, Title 14 of the Civil
Code, and was not "provided for" in any way in Chapter 2,
Title 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure at that time.
V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF TITLE INSURANCE
A. Generally
The fact that the financial damage caused by a loss of
priority as to optional advances may not be covered by title
insurance is of particular concern to the construction lender.
Thus, the construction lender bears the full loss caused by
reason of the loss of priority as to any portion of its First Lien.
This result is because no title insurer:
[W]ill insure a lender against loss of priority by reason
of... an optional advance arising by reason of a voluntary
deviation from the terms of a construction loan agreement
or by reason of the exercise of some option in the con-
struction loan agreement. This would be true because
obviously the control of the advance of loan funds is with
the lender who, by his own act in making an optional ad-
vance, creates a loss of priority of lien.'
68. Cerini, supra note 27, at 261.
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B. Title Insurance of First Liens Securing Optional Advances
The standard construction loan policy, ALTA Loan Poli-
cy-1970,"9 provides limited coverage in insuring the priority
of the lien securing the loan from purportedly superior
mechanics' liens.7" The coverage, however, is "only against
liens arising out of work funded by the proceeds of the loan
secured by the insured mortgage which were advanced at Date
of Policy or which the insured was then obligated to ad-
vance."7 Although this insurance coverage is significant, it
fails to provide all the coverage needed by the typical con-
struction lender.
Under the express terms of the construction loan policy,
title insurers only insure obligatory advances. This is so even
69. "Most institutional lenders in California declined to use the ALTA Con-
struction Loan Policy-1975, using instead the ALTA Loan Policy-1970 as the
standard construction loan policy, because it provided coverage for the priority of
the loan over mechanics' liens." JOHN L. HOSACK, CALIFORNIA TITLE INSURANCE
PRACTICE § 3.3 (Supp. 1990).
70. l&
71. Henry O'Connor, Jr., Mechanic's Lien Coverage: Have the Policy Changes
Changed the Coverage? in TITLE INSURANCE: THE NEW POLICY CHANGES 148 (1987).
The ALTA Loan Policy-1970 provides coverage for losses due to:
Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or
hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the insured mortgage,
except any such lien arising from an improvement on the land con-
tracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of Policy not fi-
nanced in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured
by the insured mortgage which at Date of Policy the insured has
advanced or is obligated to advance.
However, the ALTA Loan Policy-1970 excludes from coverage, defects,
liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters: "3(d) attaching or created
subsequent to Date of Policy (except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as
to any statutory lien for labor or materials . . . )."
The ALTA Loan Policy-1970 has now been superseded, if not yet fully
implemented, by ALTA Loan Policy-1987.
The theme that runs through [the insuring and excluding provisions
of the ALTA Loan Policy-1987] is the determination that it is only
in those cases where the mechanics' lien claim arises out of a work
financed with insured mortgage, which the insured has advanced at
Date of Policy or is obligated to advance, that the priority of the
insured mortgage is assured.
This is not a change of coverage from the 1970 Form Policy, but the
clarity with which it is now stated will surely cause many lenders to
realize that they may not have been getting all of the coverage they
expected under the 1970 Loan Policy.
Id. at 151.
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though section 3136 allows lenders to retain priority as to
optional advances when its conditions precedent are satisfied.
Some construction lenders, aware of the lack of coverage
provided by the basic title insurance policy, purchase endorse-
ments designed to insure the priority of liens securing optional
advances. For example, CLTA Form 122 endorsement states in
relevant part:
The [Blank Title Insurance] Company assures:
(1) That, except as otherwise expressly provided herein,
there are no liens, encumbrances or other matters shown
by the public records, affecting said estate or interest,
other than those shown in said policy, except:
(4) That the advance hereinafter referred to is secured by
the mortgage referred to in Schedule A; that, as shown by
the public records, said mortgage as to such advance is
prior to any liens, encumbrances and other matters affect-
ing said estate or interest other than those shown in
Schedule B as prior to said mortgage and in paragraph (2)
herein, except:
Upon assurance by the Insured that said Insured has made
an advance to _, in the sum of Dol-
lars ($ ), which is a portion of the indebtedness
evidenced by the note or notes secured by said mortgage,
the Company hereby insures against loss which the In-
sured shall sustain in the event that the assurances of the
Company herein shall prove to be incorrect, or by reason
of the establishment of priority over the lien of said mort-
gage upon said estate of any statutory lien for labor or
material arising out of the work of improvement under
construction or completed at the date hereof.
The effect of provisions (1) and (4) above is to obligate
construction lenders to ensure that recorded mechanics' liens
are paid from the proceeds of the advance being insured. Oth-
erwise, the priority of the lien securing such advance is not in-
sured as to such recorded mechanics' liens. To this extent, the
CLTA endorsement harmonizes with section 3136 in that in
order to retain priority, advances must first be used to pay off
recorded mechanics' liens.
The first half of the first insuring provision, providing that
losses which occur in the event the assurances are incorrect are
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insured, is merely the risk assumed by the tide insurance com-
panies that their title searches might not be one hundred per-
cent correct. The second half of the first insuring provision,
providing that losses caused by reason of the loss of priority to
mechanics' liens are insured, appears on first analysis to give
lenders the comfort they have been seeking. It might be read
to say that losses incurred by lenders resulting from the loss of
priority of their First Liens as to optional advances are insured.
However, what is given is quickly taken away with the third
provision of the CLTA endorsement, providing, "This indorse-
ment is made a part of said policy and is subject to the Sched-
ules, Conditions and Stipulations therein, except as modified
by the provisions hereof."
Specifically, ALTA Loan Policy-1970 excludes from cover-
age "[d]efects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other
matters ... created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the
insured claimant."" Again, title insurers will not insure losses
arising from the voluntary acts of the insured lenders. The loss
of priority of First Liens as to optional advances is caused by
the voluntary act of the lender. The endorsement neither in-
sures that the advance is obligatory nor insures that, if option-
al, it retains priority.
ALTA Construction Loan Policy Endorsements A through
D, as updated, to conform to the 1987 Loan Policy, clarify the
extent of the lack of coverage for optional advances. For exam-
ple, ALTA Construction Loan Policy Endorsement D insures
that "the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage against loss or damage sustained by reason of lack of
priority of the lien of the insured mortgage over any statutory
lien for services, labor or materials heretofore or hereafter
furnished.""
However, this apparently straightforward broad endorse-
ment specifically does not "insure against loss or damage by
reason of failure by the insured to comply with or to enforce
the provisions of any agreement to which the insured is a party
72. What was true in 1957 remains true today: No title insurance company
will insure a lender against loss of priority by reason of the voluntary deviation
from the terms of a construction loan agreement. See supra text accompanying
note 68.
73. ALTA Construction Loan Policy, Endorsement D, 1987 ed.
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which relate to advancing the proceeds of the loan secured by
the insured mortgage.""
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With no statutory protection and no insurance coverage,
lenders must act as overseers of construction borrowers for the
benefit of mechanics in order to ensure the priority of liens
securing optional advances. No trustee obligation could result
in more oversight by lenders for the protection of mechanics
and materialmen than is now offered by section 3136.
The lender's inevitable reaction to such a high obligation
is to shed both the trustee's obligation and the mechanics'
liens by early foreclosure. If the best laid schemes of mice and
men gang aft a'gley, it should not be surprising that incoherent
and piecemeal legislative schemes like the mechanics' lien laws
fail to serve their intended purpose.
A. Creation of Guarantor Subsidiary
Construction lenders do have a mechanism for obtaining
and preserving the priority of their First Lien as to the entire
loan amount. Lenders may advance the entire amount commit-
ted to be loaned prior to the commencement of the work of
improvement. Although this preserves the construction
lenders' First Liens as to the total loan amount, lenders are
reluctant to simply give the borrowers a great deal of cash with
no control over how the money is spent.
However, the lender can enjoy the control it desires and
preserve its priority as to the full amount of the loan commit-
ment by organizing a wholly-owned subsidiary to act as guaran-
tor.75 As a condition of the construction loan, the borrower
would be required to enter into an agreement with the guaran-
tor/subsidiary that would provide the guarantor/subsidiary
control over disbursements through a draw or voucher system.
As consideration for the guaranty, the borrower pays one or
more points to the guarantor/subsidiary. 6
74. Id.
75. The author wishes to thank his partner, William S. Hunter, for this cre-
ative and intriguing concept.
76. The borrower will also be liable for interest on the full amount dis-
bursed, but this can be offset by the interest earned on the principal balance
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In the event of a default by the borrower, the lender pro-
ceeds directly against the guarantor/subsidiary for the entire
amount of the loan. The guarantor/subsidiary pays off the
lender." The now-subrogated guarantor/subsidiary not only
has the same rights as the lender (i.e., a first lien on the real
property as to the entire amount of the loan), but also has a
lien on the unexpended loan proceeds. Because the guaran-
tor/subsidiary has the ability to release its lien on the cash
without releasing its lien on the real property, it can undertake
what the lender could not, advance funds to materialmen after
an event of default.
Of course, the guarantor/subsidiary structure may prove
to be problematic for some lenders. Capitalization require-
ments, banking regulations, and systemic complexity might
combine in ways too burdensome for the average lender to
endure. The implementation of guarantor/subsidiaries to ac-
complish nothing more than the circumvention of muddled
mechanics' lien law might prove, however, to be the impetus
for legislative reform.
B. Legislative Reform
If patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, the call
for legislative action is the last refuge of the lawyer confronted
with an archaic constitutional provision and a befuddling array
of judicial and legislative actions. And yet, there is little
choice.78
The question is not whether a California court will analyze
section 3136 and find that certain mechanics' liens have priori-
ty over a lender's First Lien as to optional advances. This is
inevitable. The question is whether construction lenders will
respond by strictly adhering to the express terms of their con-
struction loan agreements, failing to waive otherwise waivable
deposited in the lender's bank or savings institution. The accruing interest and the
earned interest can be offset so that the interest paid by the borrower on any
construction loan will be no more under the usual disbursement system of the
particular lender.
77. Because the guarantor/subsidiary must be able to pay off the lender, the
guarantor/subsidiary must be adequately capitalized.
78. Cf. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT OF COMM. To STUDY 1958
CONFERENCE RESOLUTION No. 70, Sept. 11, 1962 (calling for establishment of law
review commission to study mechanics' lien laws).
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conditions, and foreclosing, rather than negotiating a workout,
in the event of any and all breaches of express covenants. In-
deed, they have not.
The interests of mechanics and junior lienholders are not
advanced by the completion of a half-finished building after
their interests have been foreclosed. Mechanics and junior
lienholders may be benefitted, however, by giving lenders an
incentive to advance funds to complete construction. This
change would increase the value of the underlying security for
mechanics and junior lienholders, as well as construction lend-
ers. Therefore, section 3136 should be amended so as to im-
plement A.B. 884 as originally proposed. Liens securing op-
tional advances that would otherwise be subordinate to
mechanics' liens should retain their priority if the optional
advances are used to pay or reimburse for actual costs and ex-
penses of the work of improvement."
79. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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